Banking On Bard (BCR)

C. R. Bard (BCR), in business for over 100 years, makes a wide variety of medical-surgical supplies and instruments.  According to Value Line, Bard has four core segments: Urology (29% of 2008 sales), primarily Foley catheters; Vascular (26%), stents and angioplasty & angiography catheters; Oncology (26%), specialty catheters & ports, other related products and test materials; and Surgical Specialties (15%).

– Bard’s 2008 Annual Report explains that the company’s EPS growth was above its 14% target for the sixth consecutive year and that it raised its dividend for the 37^th consecutive year. Some 80% of BCR’s 2008 Sales came from products that were number one or two in their respective markets.  And, Bard’s products are sold in over 100 countries and it will be expanding to China and Brazil in 2009.

– I used the Bob Adams one-click spreadsheet to analyze Bard’s 2008 Annual Report and found 11 Bullish results (good things) and 5 Bearish results (not so goods), one red flag (cash flow growth is less than sales growth), and an overall score of 61 out of 100. You can get Bob’s free spreadsheet and a summary of its many features by going to my Favorite Links page: click here .

– Bard was this month’s Online Stock Study at the Better Investing website.  These studies complete a SSG in about one hour with all judgments made by consensus decision-making.  The study materials (SSG, audio-video presentation, presentation slides, and Value Line report) are available to members at the BI website.  And, all of the past monthly studies are also archived and available to BI members.

** Bob Mann, a volunteer educator with the BI Southeastern Michigan Chapter and a volunteer administrator at the CompuServe Investing for Growth Forum, led the study.  Thanks Bob for a super study.

– Below is a table that compares the Consensus SSG with my SSG and with Take Stock.  I’ve also added an earlier SSG by Bob that came from BI’s First Cut page where members  can up- and download SSGs on a two-page form that explains their judgments. 

** I’m a big fan of the monthly Online Stock Studies and First Cut; you can check them out with a free, 30-day trial membership by clicking the link above and going to my Favorite Links page which has more info on BI.

** After the table, I discuss all five judgments of the Consensus SSG.  That was what most readers wanted according to the last poll I took.

Bard, C. R. (BCR)	Bob Mann (First Cut)	Consensus SSG	Armin	Take             Stock
Date	12-31-08	5-25-09	5-25-09	5-25-09
Data	S&P	Same	Same	Hemscott-Morningstar
Price	$84.26	$71.46	Same	Same
52 week High & Low Price	$101.61 &    $70.00	Same &        $68.94	Same &           Same	n/a
Project Growth   From End of	Last             Quarter	Same	Same	Last                 Fiscal Year
Last Q of data	Q3 ending  9/30/08	Q1 ending     3/31/09	Same	Same
Sales Growth	12.00%	9.00%	10.00%	10.40%
EPS Growth	12.00%	9.00%	10.00%	05.20%
High PE	22.0              (Alt-M)	21.8	19.0	22.7
High EPS	$7.53	$7.03	$7.36	$5.23
ForecastHigh Price	$165.70	$153.30	$139.80	$118.58(~$22/sh        < VL)
Value Line Estimated High Price= $140-175 as of 2-27-09                        and  $140-170 as of 5-29-09
Low PE	14.4               (Alt-M)	Same	13.8	15.9
Low EPS	$4.27           (TTM)	$4.57           (TTM)	Same	$4.11
Forecast              Low Price	$61.50          (low PE x         low EPS)	$65.80         Same	$55.20            (80% x 52         week low)	$65.35               (low PE x          low EPS)
Upside/Down	3.6	14.4	4.2	7.7                  (imputed)
Total Return	15.7%	17.2%	15.2%	11.6%
SSG Buy Under	n/a	n/a	$64.81	$61.67
RV/PRV(no outs)	94.3/84.3	73.2/67.4	Same/66.7	n/a
Quality	n/a	n/a	S&P = A	TS 2.6         unacceptable
PTPM – 5 yr ave	23.7%           trend up	25.0%          trend up	25.0%              trend up	24.4%          trend n/a
ROE – 5 yr ave    End Equity	n/a	n/a	20.7%              trend up	n/a
ROE – 5 yr ave    Start Equity	20.1%             trend up	21.7%            trend even	23.7%                trend even	23.9%                trend n/a
Debt to Equity      – 5 yr ave	n/a	n/a	07.2%              trend even	n/a

Consensus SSG:

– The first thing Bob did was evaluate the quality of Bard.  While S&P gave BCR an “A” rating, Bob also wanted to see what the SSG showed.  He concluded that Bard was a quality company after looking at three indicators: low debt (7.0% debt to capital, much less than 33.0% guideline); quality historic growth (up, straight and parallel trend lines in SSG Section 1); and quality management (up or even PTPM and ROE trends in SSG Section 2).

** Bob would not complete any SSG if the company did not pass these three tests

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.  On the other hand, I am willing to make an exception for a PTPM or ROE downtrend if the company substantially exceeds its industry average.  I did that, and explained why, in my last post: Gauging Growth at Gilead (GILD).

(A) Estimating Future Sales Growth:

– For the first SSG judgment call, Bob gave the group four options to estimate Bard’s Sales growth for the next five years: 10.4% (10 year historic growth), 16.2% (4 year historic growth), 9.0% (next 3 year estimate from the S&P Stock Report), and 2.1% (latest quarter).  There also was a fifth option (choosing none or submit your own pick) for all five SSG judgments) which I’m not going to mention again.

** The consensus decision was 9.0%, the most conservative annual option, from the S&P estimate. 

(B) Estimating Future EPS Growth:

– Participants were also given four choices to estimate EPS growth for the next 5 years: 9.0% (same as the Sales growth choice), 14.5% (5 year historic growth), 13.0% (next 3 year estimate from the S&P Stock Report), and 10.4% (latest quarter). 

** The consensus was 9.0%, same as the Sales growth choice.

(C) Projecting the High PE:

– The group was offered four options: 21.8 (average of the 5 lowest years), 22.8 (High PE from the most recent year), 18.0 (2 x 9.0, two times the projected EPS growth or a PEG of 2), 13.5 (1.5 x 9.0, a PEG of 1.5).

** The group chose 21.8, the average of the 5 lowest years.

** This choice is Toolkit 5’s Alt-M command which is usually the most conservative of the four options offered by the software.

(D) Projecting the Low PE:

– Bob gave the participants four choices: 14.4 (average of the 5 lowest years), 15.7 (low PE from the most recent year), 16.4 (ten year average), and 9.0 (1.0 x 9.0, a PEG of 1.0).

** The consensus choice was 14.4, the average of the 5 lowest years which is also from the Alt-M command.

(E) Projecting the Low Price:

– For the last SSG judgment call, the group was given five options, the first four of which were the standard choices from the TK 5 software: $65.80 (low PE x low EPS), $61.50 (average low price in last 5 years), $68.90 (recent severe low price), $54.60 (price the dividend will support), and $57.20 (the open-ended “other” option which Bob individualized as 80% of the current price).

** The consensus choice was $65.80 (low PE x low EPS).

(F) SSG Results:

– Bob uses three tests to determine if the stock is a SSG Buy: an Upside/Downside Ratio of 3.0 or greater (Bard’s U/D was 14.4, well above the minimum); a Total Return of 15.0% or greater (Bard’s TR was 17.2%); and a Relative Value between 85-100 (Bard’s RV was 73.2 and did not satisfy Bob’s criteria).

** The SSG Handbook from BI/NAIC says that a “Relative Value between 85-110 is ideal” (page 113, 2003 edition) which suggests, at least to me, that RV is not a mandatory criteria.

** I am not a fan of the RV or Projected RV: they turn on the outliers eliminated in SSG Section 3 (you and I may make different choices which are never revealed) and is also an unreliable indicator in a Bear market like our current one where the price (and, as a result, the PE and RV) have fallen considerably.

– I always like to compare the SSG’s Forecast High Price ($153.30) to Value Line’s estimated High Price ($140-170) which I use as one benchmark to judge reasonableness.  If my Forecast High Price was substantially higher or lower than VL’s estimate (as is the case here with Take Stock, but not with the Consensus SSG), and I didn’t have a good reason supporting my opinion, I would reconsider my judgments: See: Determining What’s Reasonable and What’s Not

– Bob’s earlier SSG used almost the same judgments, but got a much higher U/D (14.4 vs 3.6) primarily because Bard’s price had fallen by $13 per share in the intervening five months.

Armin’s SSG:

(A) Estimating Future EPS Growth:

– When I did my SSG, the six analysts I always check were closely estimating long-term EPS at an average of 13.92% with Zacks.com high at 14.20% and Value Line low at 13.00% (VL has since lowered its estimate slightly to 12.50%).  S&P and FactSet CallStreet via CNNMoney were both 14.00% and Reuters.com and FirstCall via YahooFinance were both 14.17%.

** At Reuters, 8 analysts contributed to the consensus estimate and ranged from a high of 16.0% to a low of 13.0%.  At CNNMoney, 6 analysts ranged from a high of 15.0% to a low of 13.0%.

** I estimated 10.00% EPS, well under the analysts, and the combination of my EPS estimate and High PE resulted in a $139.80 Forecast High Price, at the very low end of VL’s estimated $140-175 High Price. 

** I’m comfortable with my conservative SSG judgments especially, as here, when I know next-to-nothing about the company.

(B) Bard’s PTPM and ROE vs Industry Averages

– S&P places Bard in the Health Care Equipment industry and BCR is better than its 5 year industry average in terms of Pre-Tax Profit Margin (25.0% vs 16.8%) and Return on Equity (20.7% or 23.7%, depending on how ROE is calculated, vs 14.00%).

– Hemscott-Morningstar places Bard in the Medical Instruments and Supplies industry which has 118 companies.  With Hemscott data:

** Bard’s Pre-Tax Profit Margin ranks ninth, is slightly better than its industry average (24.3% vs 22.8%), but the industry average is skewed high (one company has a 311.4% PTPM).

** Bard’s Return on Equity ranks eighth, is worse than its industry average (20.8% vs 31.9%), but the industry average is also skewed high (two companies have a 690.5% and 100.5% ROE).

– For more on industry info, which can be confusing, see Investigating Industry Info.

(C) SSG Results:

– My SSG satisfied the Buy criteria with a 4.2 U/D and 15.2% TR and my Forecast High Price was at the very low end of VL’s estimated High Price.

** VL’s estimated High Price is for the next 3-5 years and I think it is an appropriate benchmark for our SSGs because it is for the next 5 years (and 4 as well as 3 years).  Moreover, I consider a SSG Forecast High Price to be unreasonable only if it substantially exceeds or falls below VL and only if I have no good reason supporting such a judgment.  Further research can provide a good reason and VL does not always have the best judgment. 

** It looks like many SSGs will satisfy the minimum BUY criteria (TR = 15%, U/D = 3.0) as BCR’s price has fallen 15% in the last 3 months since VL’s February report.

Take Stock:

– Take Stock is a computerized, one-click program at the StockCentral website that is designed to produce a conservative result with no judgment by the user.

** It estimated extremely low EPS growth (5.2%) compared to the analysts (13.92% average) which resulted in an extremely low Forecast High Price, $22/share under the low end of VL’s estimated High Price.  As a result, Take Stock got a low TR of 11.6% which does not satisfy the Buy criteria.

** Tale Stock’s Quality rating was 2.6, or unacceptable, as a minimum of 3.4 is required to pass muster and 6.7 is desired.  On the other hand, S&P rated Bard an “A”, the second highest of its 8 grades.

 

-Armin

Gauging Growth at Gilead (GILD)

[AF: SSG Armin-2 revised 6-9-09]

Gilead Sciences (GILD) is a pharmaceutical biotech that makes drugs primarily to treat viral diseases.  It concentrates on four areas: HIV/AIDS which is by far its largest segment, liver diseases, cardiovascular, and respiratory.

Business Week reported that GILD’s top three HIV drugs generated 84% of its sales in 2008.  It also wrote that new cases of HIV in the U.S. are estimated at 56,000 per year, with only 50% receiving treatment, and that GILD has solid growth opportunities. 

Company Background

– Gilead was the best performer in Business Week’s 2009 rating of “The BW 50”, March 26, 2009.  The magazine combined Return on Investment and Sales growth to come up with its rating.  GILD ranked first in ROI (48.6%) and fifth in Sales growth (38.2%) to wind up in first place.

– The company’s growth has been explosive, but is slowing as GILD matures: growth was 53% Sales and 169% EPS over the last 10 years, 42% Sales and 44% EPS for the last 5, and 33% and 29% over the last 3 years (using S&P data).  In 2008, both Sales and EPS growth were 26%.

– GILD was the Stock to Study in the April 2009 issue of Better Investing magazine which reported that the company spent about 14% of it sales on R&D.  It is also spending $1.4 B to buy CV Therapeutics which develops drugs for cardiovascular diseases. 

– Morningstar reported that even though GILD has 10 years remaining until key patents begin to expire, it is diversifying with the $2.5 B acquisition of Myogen in 2006 and the pending $1.4 B acquisition of CV Therapeutics.

– Analyzing the Annual Report, the one-click spreadsheet by Bob Adams, gave GILD’s 2008 A.R. a total score of 49 out of 100, identified 3 red flags, 16 green flags (very goods) and found 9 bullish and 8 bearish results. The red flags were that the cost of sales was up 47% and growing faster than sales, that long-term debt at 31% was more than BI’s 25% guideline, and that the price to sales ratio was higher than its industry average.

** To get this free and easy to use spreadsheet and a summary of its many features, click here to go to my Favorite Links page.

SSGing GILD:

– The New Jersey Stock Study Group recently analyzed GILD.  It’s SSG is available from BI’s First Cut section where members can up- and download SSGs on a two page form that explains each judgment.  The Study Group’s discussion was led by Brian Altschul who also led the BI Online Stock Study on W.W. Grainger (GWW), see: Grappling With Grainger.

– Here’s a table comparing the Study Group’s SSG with two of mine and with Take Stock.  Both of my SSGs contain the sane judgments, but Armin-1 uses S&P data while Armin-2 uses Hemscott data.

[AF: I revised Armin-2 below on 6-9 so that it uses the same price as Armin-1 which then changed some of the SSG results.  Jim Thomas, on the BI Discussion List, pointed out that these prices were initially different and confused the comparison.]

Gilead Sciences(GILD)	N. J. Stock          Study Group	Armin-1	Armin-2	Take             Stock
Date	5-15-09	5-29-09	Same	Same
Data	S&P	S&P	Hemscott-Morningstar	Same
Price	$44.01	$42.13	$42.13	$42.02
52 week High &  Low Price	$57.63 &             $35.60	Same &         Same	Same &         Same	n/a
Project Growth From End of	Last                         Quarter	Same	Same	Last                Fiscal Year
Last Reported Quarter	Q 1                   ending  3-31-09	Same	Same	Same
Sales Growth	14.00%	14.00%	Same	20.00%
EPS Growth	11.50%	12.00%	Same	20.00% init   19.36% final
High PE	25.0	22.0	Same	28.6
High EPS	$3.83	$3.90	$3.89	$5.11
High Price	$95.70                   (12% > VL)	$86.00           (01% > VL)	$85.60	$145.97           (72% > VL)
Value Line Estimated High Price = $65-85 @ $47.43 as of 4-17-09  and        $65- 85  @  $49.63 as of 1-16-09
Low PE	15.0	14.0	Same	17.5
Low EPS	$2.11	$2.12	$2.21	$2.21
Low Price	$31.60                      (low PE x                 low EPS)	$31.10           (low PE x      low EPS)	$30.90 (Same)	$38.18             (low PE x     low EPS)
Upside/Down	4.2	4.0	3.9	27.1                (imputed)
Total Return	16.9%	15.3%	15.2%	28.3%
SSG Buy Under	n/a	$42.76	$42.56	$65.47
RV/PRV (no outs)	56.6/50.8	73.4/65.4	74.3/66.2	n/a
Quality	n/a	S&P = B-	n/a	TS = 6.8         (excellent)
PTPM – 5 yr ave	53.8%                  Trend down	Same &         Same	50.2%           Trend up	50.2%             Trend n/a
ROE – 5 yr ave Ending Equity	n/a	40.9%           Trend up	41.4%           Trend up	n/a
ROE – 5 yr ave Starting Equity	52.3%                    Trend up	Same &        Same	52.6%             Trend up	52.6%              Trend n/a
Debt to Equity –  5 yr ave	33.5%                    Trend up	30.6%            Same	30.5%            Trend up	n/a

SSG by the New Jersey Stock Study Group:

(A) Sales Growth

– The Study Group projected 14.00% future Sales growth as a consensus decision with individual estimates ranging from 13 to 17%.  No reason was stated for choosing 14%.

** As GILD has grown larger, its Sales growth has steadily declined from 53% over the past 10 years to 26% in 2008. 

 ** The First Cut write-up mentions that Value Line’s estimate was 14.50%, but that actually was for Sales per share as VL makes no estimate for Sales growth.  However, we can imply a Sales growth rate from VL’s dollar estimates of 10.90% (traditional method) to 13.45% (VL’s method).

** Estimating future Sales growth is difficult because, unlike EPS, there are few websites that provide any benchmarks.  The only long-term Sales estimates I know of are VL’s implied growth of 10.9-13.5% , Zacks.com’s 42.83% (which seems way unreliable), and Morningstar’s analyst report that estimates 11.0% over the next 10 years. . 

(B) EPS Growth

– The Group projected 11.50% EPS growth also as a consensus decision with individual estimates ranging from 10 to 17%.  The 11.50% came from using the Preferred Procedure.

** The PP was based on the following estimates for the next 5 years: 14.00% Sales, 45.80% Pre-Tax Profit Margin (down from the 53.8% default), 30.00% Tax (up from 26.1% default), and 906.5M shares (the default).

** PTPM has been declining from 57.5% in 2005 to 51.3% in 2008, so using 45.80% anticipates a huge decline; increasing the Tax Rate to 30.00% is the same as VL’s estimate; and the 906.5M shares estimate ignored VL’s estimate of 860M shares.

(C) Projected High and Low PEs

– The Study Group saw that High PEs had declined in the last several years and thought that trend would continue as the company was maturing.  So, it chose 25.0 in order to be conservative.  Similar reasoning led the Group to choose 15.0 as the Low PE.

(D) SSG Results

– The combination of estimating 11.50% EPS growth and a 25.0 High PE resulted in a Forecast High Price of $95.70, some 12% greater than the high end of VL’s $65-85 estimate.  I never want to substantially exceed VL (like Take Stock here) and anything more than 15-20% above VL would make me rethink my judgments.

** GILD was a SSG Buy for the New Jersey Study Group with a 4.7 Upside-Downside Ratio and a Total Return of 16.7%, both of which were well in excess of the 3.0 and 15.0% minimum criteria.

Armin’s SSGs:

(A) EPS Growth

– When I did my SSG, Value Line had recently lowered its long-term EPS estimate from 17.50% to 12.00% without explanation.  VL’s change was huge, but its High Price estimate was not changed.

– The 5 other analysts I always check were very close in estimating long-term EPS at an average of 17.09% with Reuters Thomson via YahooFinance high at 17.52% and Zacks.com low at 16.95%.  Reuters.com was 16.99%, and S&P as well as FactSet Call Street via CNN Money were 17.00%. 

** The Reuters estimate was from 14 analysts who ranged from a high of 23.0% to a low of 13.10%.  FactSet CallStreet’s estimate was from 9 analysts who ranged from a high of 23.0% to a low of 15.0%. 

** The average of all 6 estimates less two Standard Deviations was 14.14% (which Excel easily calculated) and my rule-of-thumb is anything below two SDs is usually too conservative and unreasonably low.  Here, however, the lowest of all analysts was Value Line’s 12.00% which I decided to use.

** Unlike the Study Group, I stopped using the Preferred Procedure because it involves too many estimates and too much guesswork for me.  The Sales estimate is critical to the PP and, if you start (too) low, you’re bound to end up (too) low.  See: Pondering the Preferred Procedure.

(B) PTPM and ROE vs Industry Averages

– S&P places Gilead in the Biotechnology Industry and, as of 5-6-09, GILD was way better than its industry PTPM average (53.8%, trending down vs 24.4%) and slightly worse than its industry ROE average (40.9%, trending up vs 46.0%)

** A PTPM downtrend is usually a red flag indicating poor quality.  However, I’m not bothered by GILD’s downtrend in PTPM because its PTPM is so much better than its industry average.  GILD is so much better (53.8% vs 23.4%) that I’m concerned it might be it making excessive profits on its HIV drugs.

– Hemscott-Morningstar places GILD in the same industry and its PTPM ranks 3^rd out of 228 companies.  (The industry average is skewed because of one company, ACHN, with an incredible 3514.6% PTPM).  GILD’s ROE also ranks 3^rd.

(C) Debt to Equity

– Even though the Study Group and Armin-1 both used S&P data, our Debt to Equity was inexplicably different from 2005 through 2008. The Study Group’s SSG used Toolkit 6 while I used TK 5, and both should get the same result as we used the same data.

(D) SSG Results

 – Armin-1 with S&P data had a Forecast High Price of $86, just 1% more than VL’s estimate, and resulted in a SSG Buy with a 4.0 U/D and a 15.3% TR.

 [AF: After I corrected the price of Armin-2, which uses Hemscott data, it was also a SSG Buy with a 3.9 U/D, 15.2% TR and a Forecast High Price of $85.60.]

Take Stock:

– Take Stock is a computerized program at the StockCentral website that is designed to produce a conservative result with one click and no judgment by the user. It produces an almost-SSG, and does not use the U/D or RV/PRV concepts

 (A) Final Results

– Take Stock’s $145.92 Forecast High Price was a whopping 72% higher than VL’s estimated $65-85, unreasonably high in my judgment.  That’s because its 19.36% estimated EPS was well in excess of any analyst and its 28.6 Projected High PE was also high by comparison.  See: Determining What’s Reasonable and What’s Not.

– I imputed a 27.1 U/D which is also way high primarily because Take Stock’s Forecast Low Price ($38.18) was very close to GILD’s current price ($42.02).  Take Stock’s design even allows its Low Price to exceed the stock’s current price which is a SSG No-No according to the BI/NAIC SSG Handbook.

QUESTIONS:

– Please help me answer these questions:

(1) The Study Group estimated 11.50% EPS growth based on its Preferred Procedure and I used 12.00% based on VL’s estimate because it was the lowest of the six analysts I checked.  What EPS estimate would you use and why?

(2) How would you learn if GILD’s PTPM was excessive and/or exploitive?  Can you ascertain what’s a typical or average profit on new prescription drugs??

(3) Does anyone have a clue as to why the Study Group got a Debt to Equity ratio (33.5%) that is different from what I got (30.6%) even though both SSGs used the same S&P data???

[AF: Jim Thomas also answered this question by explaining that the TK 6 software, which the Study Group used,  calculates Debt to Equity differently than TK 5 which I use. That difference makes meaningful comparisons of Debt to Equity impossible.  Subsequently, Douglas Gerlach explained (in a 6/16 webinar at StockCentral) that TK 5 and TK 6 would be made identical with respect to Debt to Equity after TK 6.2 is issued in the next few weeks.]

– Armin

=========================================================================================

[AF: The following was Brian Altshul’s response by e-mail which WordPress won’t allow me to post as a comment.]

Interesting Armin. I’ll look more into the debt to equity ratio and talk about that in my classes. I think that was the first SSG we did using TK6.

As for your assessment, I’ll make several points in rebuttal.

VL doesn’t estimate 5 years out, so your comparison of the VL price isn’t totally accurate. It states that it’s estimates are all 3-5 years, making the use of the figures additionally problematic. I am personally comfortable with your use of $88 as your high price, it is in fact right around double the price at the time of the study. But comparing it with VL estimates isn’t all that useful other than a point of information.

You complain about the application of 14% sales, but you have used the same on both SSGs. The decision was a consensus of the group. There was a very narrow range amongst the group.

The profit margin was lowered in an effort to be conservative, but you are correct in saying that this could be a signal of eroding management. In our research we saw comments from management that competition in their main areas may cut into their margins in the future. That was part of the rationale for lowering it. As for the high profit margins, I think this is typical of young drug companies with immature drug product lines. As the products age, the margins decline. They also justify their profits citing high R&D costs to bring the products to market, the many failures they typically experience (even if it’s not the case) and the R&D expenses in the future. I won’t comment on the ethics of all of this, but it is the current system.

As for the use of the Preferred Procedure, I think it’s an excellent tool, but as with any tool care must be taken. There are times when it is unusable.

You question the PP, but the results were very similar to your own. If sales will be 14%, what will lower earnings to 12% other than either higher expenses or lower margins? Sure, taxes are a possibility, but will they skyrocket to a % beyond rates of other US corporations? I would doubt that. I would say that you agree on a lowering of the profit margin.

Lastly, I’ll point out that this SSG was a consensus decision and therefore blame the group on the final product. 🙂

I think you make several interesting points. Maybe you’ll consider sending your SSG in for a First Cut?

Feel free to publish my comments on your site without revision if you like.

Best regards,
Brian

Sent from my BlackBerry® smartphone with Nextel Direct Connect

——————————————————————————–
From: Armin Fields
Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2009 11:57:02 -0700 (PDT)
To:
Subject: GILD

Hey Brian:

Did you know that Toolkit 6 calculates Debt to Equity differently than Toolkit 5?

That makes comparisons of D/E unnecessarily confusing.

I uncovered this when I compared the New Jersey Study Group’s SSG (TK 6) for GILD, which I got from BI’s First Cut page, with mine (TK 5).

If you’re interested in my assessment, check out:

Gauging Growth At Gilead (GILD)
https://arminfields.wordpress.com/2009/06/01/gauging-growth-at-gilead-gild/

Armin