Checking Out Coach (COH)
November 5, 2009
- Coach (COH) designs, makes and sells luxury apparel, primarily expensive women’s handbags, and has been hard hit by our current recession. My software’s PERT-A shows steadily declining EPS growth for the last 8 consecutive quarters with COH’s worst performance in the last quarter (ending 9-30-09) at -8.1% EPS, worse than its -6.8% in the prior quarter.
- However COH’s stock price has gained 60% in the last 12 months (from around $12 per share to $33), some 35% in the last 6 months, and almost nothing in the last month.
- Is Coach a good SSG Buy at this time which means, to SSGers, is it a good growth company that is selling at a good price? Let’s see.
Company Background:
- According to Wikinvest and COH’s latest Annual Report, the company operates in two segments: Direct-to-Consumer that consists of Coach-operated retail stores in North America, Japan, Hong Kong, Macau, and mainland China (84% of FY 2009 sales); and the Indirect segment that includes twp units, United States Wholesale and Coach International, both of which supply department stores and other authorized retailers.
** Women’s handbags are the company’s main driver of sales even though Coach has been trying to diversify its product lines. Handbags have gone from 65% of sales in FY 2006 to 62% in FY 2009 while accessories have increased from 28 to 29% and all other products also have increased from 7 to 9%.
** In addition to product diversification, Coach has several other plans to spur future growth:
>> a new ultra-luxury division that will sell expensive apparel in a small number of independent boutiques, not in Coach stores;
>> a new Poppy collection that is targeted to younger women which, in Q1 FY 2010, increased the company’s sales by 1%;
>> aggressive expansion into China, to capitalize on the emergence of its growing middle class, with plans to open 50 retail stores in the next 5 years and increase its market share from 3 to 10%.
- Coach has 330 full price stores and 111 factory stores in North America, 155 stores in Japan, and 128 stores in other parts of the Far East.
- Two years ago, COH was BI’s Growth Company of the year. At that time it was selling for $44.53 per share and looked like a SSG Buy to me. See: Coach (COH): Better Investing’s Growth Company for the Year 2007, September 3, 2007
Company Financials:
- Value Line rated Coach an “A” for Financial Strength with $800 M in cash assets and only $25 M in debt. Morningstar held that Coach was in “excellent” financial health with little debt and the ability to turn about 20% of its sales into free cash flow.
- The super-duper Annual Report spreadsheet by Bob Adams gave Coach’s 2009 A.R a 44 out of 100 with 9 Bullish and 9 Bearish results:
** The Bullish-good things included increasing sales and they are increasing faster than cash flow, reasonable debt to equity, and good return on free cash flow. The Bearish not-so-goods included increasing accounts receivable and inventories, the cost of sales increasing faster than sales, and free cash flow less than sales growth;
** You can get this free spreadsheet and an explanation of its many features by going to my Favorite Links page: click here.
- In April 2009, the Coach Board voted to initiate a cash dividend of $0.30 per share.
Discussion:
- Here’s a table comparing P.V.’s SSG, which I got from the BI First Cut page, with two of mine and with Take Stock. The only difference between my two SSGs is that Armin-1 uses S&P data from the Better Investing website while Armin-2 uses Hemscott-Morningstar data from the StockCentral website.
- After the table, I discuss issues identified by the comparison.
| Coach (COH) | P.V. | Armin-1 | Armin-2 | Take Stock |
| Date | 10-21-09 | 10-29-09 | Same | Same |
| Data | S&P | S&P | Morningstar- Hemscott | Same |
| Price | $33.14 | $32.87 | Same | $31.83 |
| 52 week High & Low Price | $35.47 & $11.41 | Same & Same | Same & Same | Not Included |
| Last Quarter of Reported Data | Q1 ending 9-30-09 | Same | Q4 ending 6-30-09 | Same |
| Software Used | TK 5 | Same | Same | Online TS |
| Project Growth From End of | Last FY | Last Q | Same | Last FY |
| Sales Growth | 12.00% | 13.00% | Same | 01.50% |
| EPS Growth | 15.40% | 13.00% | Same | -10.80% |
| High PE | 27.0 | 21.1 (3 yrs out) | 21.5 (Same) | 25.2 |
| High EPS | $3.91 | $3.54 | $3.53 | $1.88 |
| High Price | $105.60 (78% > VL as of 8-7-09) | $74.70 (25% > VL) | $75.90 (27% > VL) | $27.21 (15% < current price |
|
Value Line Estimated High Price =$40-60 as of 8-7-09 and $45-65 as of 11-6-09 |
||||
| L ow PE | 11.0 | 8.6 (3 yrs out) | 8.7 (Same) | 10.2 |
| Low EPS | $1.92 | Same | $1.91 | $1.91 |
| Low Price | $15.00 (“other” option) | $16.50 (low PE x low EPS option) | $16.60 (Same) | $19.48 |
| Upside/Down | 4.0 | 2.6 | 1.7 | Impossible to Calculate |
| Total Return | 26.6% | 17.8% | 13.1% | -02.8% |
| SSG Buy Under | Not Available | $36.05 | $27.55 | $13.78 |
| RV/PRV | 82.4/71.2 (no outs) | 114.8/101.7 (3 yrs out) | 113.9/105.5 (Same) | Not Included |
| RV/PRV(no outs) | 82.4/71.2 | 81.4/72.1 | Not Included | |
| Quality | Not Available | S&P = B+ | Hemscott = Not Included | 1.10 (unacceptable) |
| PTPM – 5 yr ave | 36.7% Trend down | Same Same | 36.2% Same | Same Trend N/A |
| ROE – 5 yr ave End Equity | 38.0% Trend down | Same Same | 38.6% Same | Not Included |
| ROE – 5 yr ave Start Equity | Not Available | 45.9% Trend down | 46.5% Same | Same Trend N/A |
| Debt to Equity – 5 yr ave | Not Available | 0.5% Trend up | Same Same | Not Included |
Estimating Future EPS Growth:
(1) P.V. used the BI/NAIC Preferred Procedure to estimate 15.40% EPS and wrote that unidentified analysts were estimating 15.30% which I did not find.
(2) I now check seven different analysts (up from six) for their long-term EPS estimates which averaged 13.71% for Coach with FactSet via Morningstar.com (the new source) high at 15.60% and Value Line low at 7.50%. Thomson Reuters via YahooFinance was 13.08%, Reuters.com was 14.35%, S&P and FactSet CallStreet via CNN Money were both 15.00%, and Zacks.com was 15.41%.
** The 9 analysts at FactSet CallStreet via CNN Money ranged from a low of 8.00% to a high of 25.00% as did the 11 analysts at Reuters.
** Value Line’s estimate of 7.50% looks like an outlier so the average without VL is 14.74% [VL’s 7.50% estimate remained unchanged in its 11-6-09 report]. That average less 1 Standard Deviation is 13.82% and less 2 SDs is 12.90%.
** I decided to use 13.00% (12.90% rounded) and thought that the 8.00% low estimates at CNN Money and at Reuters as well as VL’s 7.50% were too low compared to the other estimates. My estimate is conservative based on the average without VL less 2 SDs. Unlike PV, whose estimate was optimistic, I saw no turn-around in COH’s declining EPS growth or any other ground to be optimistic.
** For how I estimate EPS for all my SSGs, see Estimating EPS which I have updated to include the new source, FactSet via Morningstar.com.
(3) Take Stock estimated -10.8% (that’s a negative 10.8%) EPS growth for the next 5 years which seems way, way unreliable, untrustworthy and unreasonable compared to the other estimates.
Forecast High Price:
(1) P’s 27.0 Forecast High PE (times) his $2.70 Estimated High EPS (equaled) his $105.60 Forecast High Price which was a whopping 78% greater than Value Line’s High Price estimate of $40-60.
** That’s way too much for me!! See: Determining What’s Reasonable and What’s Not: An Update.
(2) My 21.1 Forecast High PE (2005-06-07 eliminated as outliers) x my $3.54 Estimated High EPS = my $74.70 Forecast High Price which was 25% greater than VL’s estimate.
** Usually, I don’t like to exceed Value Line by such a la.rge amount, but I thought VL’s estimates were low-balls, especially its 7.50% EPS estimate.
** Just as importantly, I still did not satisfy the SSG Buy criteria despite my high Forecast High Price as my 2.6 Upside/Downside Ratio was below the 3.0 requirement.
(3) Take Stock got a $27.21 Forecast High Price in the next 5 years which was less than Coach’s current price of $31.83. Bizarre! Implausible!! Unbelievable!!!
Pre-Tax Profit Margin (PTPM) and Return on Equity (ROE):
(1) P did not address the down trends in Coach’s PTPM and ROE, although he did find that COH’s 5-year averages were better than the averages for what he called the Apparel Industry.
(2) I found that S&P places Coach in the Textile – Apparel & Luxury Goods Industry and that COH was much better than those Industry Averages, although my industry numbers were somewhat lower than P’s.
(3) I also found that Hemscott-Morningstar places Coach in the Apparel, Accessories & Luxury Goods Industry where COH is also much better than its Industry Averages ranking #2 out of 24 companies for both PTPM and ROE.
** While Take Stock uses Hemscott data, TS sadly does not make industry comparisons.
Final Results:
(1) P.V. satisfied the SSG Buy criteria (a minimum 3.0 Upside/Downside and 15% Total Return) with a 4.0 U/D and a 26.6% TR. However, to do so, his Forecast High Price exceeded Value Line’s estimate by a enormous 78%.
** Any SSG can be prepared that satisfies the Buy criteria if we are not concerned with using reasonable judgments. Just claiming “This or that seems reasonable” is not adequate.
(2) Armin-1 and Armin-2 did not satisfy the SSG Buy criteria as both got a U/D under the minimum 3.0 criteria even though my Forecast High Price was 25% greater than VL’s estimate with S&P data and 27% greater with Hemscott data.
(3) Take Stock got a -2.8% Total Return (that’s a negative 2.8%) and deliberately does not use the Upside/Downside concept.
** Take Stock’s analysis was doomed from the start when it began with a -10.8% (that’s a negative 10.8%) EPS estimate. As a result, its Forecast High Price was less than its current price which makes it impossible even impute any U/D.
** Lastly, a Forecast High Price that is low, and that is lower than the stock’s current price, is absurd in my judgment.
-Armin
Pouring Over Pepsi (PEP)
August 30, 2009
PepsiCo (PEP) has 18 global mega-brands, each with annual sales of more than $1 billion, and they include Pepsi Cola, Gatorade, Mountain Dew, Fritos, Lay’s, Doritos, Tostitos, and Quaker. Pepsi is a global beverage, snack and food company and makes a wide range of snacks, carbonated and non-carbonated beverages, and foods that it sells in some 200 countries.
Company Background
Sales in PEP’s North American beverage segment fell 7% in the second quarter of this year while Coke’s sales fell only 1% according to Morningstar. However, Pepsi’s snack food segment showed solid growth. Its North American snack business is PEP’s most profitable sector, generating 33% of its total sales and 44% of its profits. Through its Frito-Lay division, PepsiCo is the world’s largest snack food company, controlling almost 40% of the U.S. salty snack market and around 30% of the non-U.S. market.
PEP’s latest 10Q quarterly report shows that Frito-Lay is the largest of its six segments accounting for 30% of Net Revenues for the last 12 weeks and 33% for the last 24 weeks. Sales of Pepsi Cola and other beverages by the Pepsi Americas segment amounted to 25% in both periods. Bottle Case Sales, a common measure PEP uses for all of its soft drinks, declined 6% “reflecting continued softness in the North American liquid refreshment category.” (7-22-09, page 34) Worse, non-carbonated beverage volume in North America dropped 14%, primarily due to double digit declines in Gatorade sports drinks and Aquafina water.
And, PEP’s sales have declined for four consecutive quarters.
In August, PEP announced it had reached a deal to buy the outstanding shares of its two main bottlers for $7.8 billion, ending a months-long disagreement over the price. Before the deal was final, Value Line thought the purchase would contribute to long-term growth of sales and EPS. However, with declining sales of carbonated and non-carbonated soft drinks, I don’t understand what Pepsi hopes to concretely accomplish.
Below, I compare and then discuss AnnC’s SSG, which I got from BI’s First Cut page, with mine and with Take Stock.
PepsiCo (PEP) |
AnnC, from BI’s First Call | Armin | Take Stock |
| Date | 7-13-09 | 7-17-09 | 7-16-09 |
| Data | S&P | Same | Hemscott |
| Price | $55.52 | $56.66 | $57.28 |
| 52 week High & Low Price | $72.25 & $43.78 | Same & Same | Not Included |
| Last Quarter of Reported Data | Q1 ending 3-31-09 | Same | Same |
| Software Used | TK 5 | Same | TS Online |
| Project Growth From End of | Last FY | Last Q | Last FY |
| Sales Growth | 6.00% | 8.00% | 8.50% |
| EPS Growth | 7.00% | 8.00% | -5.1% |
| High PE | 20.0 | 21.0 | 22.5 |
| High EPS | $4.85 | $5.13 | $2.47 |
| High Price | $97.00 | $107.20 | $55.49 |
|
Value Line Estimated High Price = $90-110 as of 5-1-09 and 7-31-09 |
|||
| Low PE | 12.0 | 14.4 (from 2008, lowest in last 10 years) | 17.3 |
| Low EPS | $3.49 (TTM) | Same | $3.17 |
| Low Price | $41.90 (Low PE x Low EPS) | $43.80 (Recent Severe Low Price) | $57.28 (same as Current Price) |
| Upside/Down | 3.00 | 4.0 | Impossible to Calculate |
| Total Return | 13.8% | 15.6% | 2.2% |
| Final Result | SSG HOLD | SSG BUY | DON’T BUY |
| SSG Buy Under | $53.00 | $60.85 | $31.39 |
| RV/PRV (no outs) | 77.6/72.5 | 79.0/73/3 | Not Included |
| Quality | N/A | A+ | 2.2 (Unacceptable) |
| PTPM – 5 yr ave | 19.3% Trend down | Same Same | 18.9% Trend N/A |
| ROE – 5 yr ave with End Equity | 33.4% Trend down | Same Same | Not Included |
| ROE – 5 yr ave with Start Equity | N/A | 33.8% Trend down | 33.9% Trend N/A |
| Debt to Equity – 5 yr ave | N/A | 27.8% Trend up | Not Included |
DISCUSSION
1. EPS Estimates:
(A) AnnC’s SSG
** Ann used the BI/NAIC Preferred Procedure to estimate 7.00% EPS growth. Her PP was based on the following five estimates: 6.00% Sales growth [less] 18.0% Pre-Tax Profit Margin (overriding the 19.3% default) [less] 26.7% Tax (default) [less] -0- Preferred Dividends (overriding the $2.0 per share default [divided by] 1556 M Shares Outstanding (default) [equals] 7.2% EPS. Ann used 7.0% EPS.
** Compared to Ann’s 6.00% expected Sales growth, Zacks.com estimated 10.17% while Morningstar Premium estimated 4.00% internal growth. However, Mstar recognized that PEP’s nearly 10.00% historical Sales growth in the last 5 years included several acquisitions and also the advantageous effects of a weak dollar.
** Unlike Ann, I no longer use the PP and think it involves too many estimates and too much guesswork. Moreover, if you start with a low estimate of Sales growth, you usually wind up with a very low EPS estimate. See: Pondering the Preferred Procedure, http://arminfields.wordpress.com/2009/03/28/pondering-the- preferred-procedure/
(B) Armin’s SSG
** When I did my SSG, the six analysts I always check were estimating long term EPS at an average of 9.775% with Zacks.com high at 11.53% and Value Line low at 8.00%. First Call via YahooFinance was 9.47%, Reuters.com was 9.65%, and S&P and FactSet CallStreet via CNN Money were both 10.00%.
** Three analysts contributed to the consensus at Reuters and ranged from 10.0% to 8.9%. The three analysts at FactSet ranged from 11.0% to 9.0%.
** I used 8.00% EPS based on Value Line’s estimate which was the lowest of all the estimates. To know which is the lowest, we must check all six.
** PEP’s historical EPS has been steadily declining for the last 5 years from 11.0% in 2004 down to 2.7% in 2008.
(C) Take Stock
** TS estimated -5.10% EPS (that’s a negative 5.10%) which was a whopping 14.80% less than the average of the six analysts and 13.10% less than VL, the lowest of the six estimates. I consider that unreasonably conservative and, once again, we need to check all six analysts to make that judgment.
2. Forecast High Prices:
** Ann’s Forecast High Price was $97.00 which was close to, but not below, the low end of VL’s $90-110 estimate.
** I got $107.70 which was close to, but not above, the high end of VL’s estimate.
** Both forecasts seem reasonable to me as my rule of thumb is to never substantially exceed or fall below VL’s estimate, at least not without a good reason. See: Determining What’s Reasonable and What’s Not: An Update, http://arminfields.wordpress.com/2009/07/15/determinung-whatsreasonable-and-whats-not-an-update/
** Take Stock’s Forecast High Price was $55.49 which was a huge 38% below the low end of VL’s $90-110 estimate and which, once again, seems unreasonable and irrational by comparison since PEP was then currently selling for $57.28.
3. Pre-Tax Profit Margin and Return on Equity
(A) PTPM
** With S&P data, which Ann and I both used, PEP’s 5-year average PTPM was 19.3% and trending down. Down trends are usually a red flag indicating poor performance. However, S&P places PepsiCo in the Soft Drinks Industry whose 5-year average PTPM was 11.6%, substantially worse than PEP.
** With Hemscott data, which Take Stock used, PEP’s average PTPM was 18.9% while its industry average, this time in the Processed and Packaged Goods Industry, was 8.1% and again substantially worse than PEP which ranked third of 61 companies (as of May 6, 2009).
(B) ROE
** With S&P data, PEP’s average ROE was 33.4%, trending up, and its industry average of 20.9% was substantially worse.
** With Hemscott data, PEP’s average ROE was 33.3% and again its industry average of 21.0% was substantially worse. PepsiCo ranked 7 out of 61 companies.
4. Final Results :
** Ann got a SSG Hold with a 3.0 Upside/Downside ratio and a 13.8% Total Return which did not satisfy the minimum 15.0% TR criteria.
** I got a SSG Buy with a 4.0 U/D and a 15.6% TR.
** Take Stock does not use the Buy, Hold or Sell criteria nor the U/D concept and it seems likely that TS would say Dump/Don’t Buy PEP.
** S&P rated PepsiCo’s quality as A+ while Take Stock rated PEP a 2.2, unacceptable.
5. Final Thoughts:
** Ann projected future growth from the last FY while I used the last Quarter. If she had projected from the last Q, her U/D would have been 3.1 (instead of 3.0) and her Total Return would have been 14.8% (instead of 13.8%). That is an almost SSG Buy and, as the FY progresses with one or two more reported quarters, is likely to be a solid SSG Buy.
** Regardless of what my SSG shows, I’m not impressed with PepsiCo.
- Armin
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Investigating Industry Info
May 8, 2009
This post discusses four issues about industry info using FactSet Research Systems as an example: (1) How to find competitors of the company you are SSGing; (2) Where to find the industry of that company in order to compare its fundamentals, such as Pre-Tax Profit Margin and Return on Equity, to industry averages; (3) But, be warned: different industry classifications at different websites mean different industry data and that means conflicting comparisons; and (4) How I deal with this mess.
Determining what industry a company is in can be difficult and confusing. Every place you look seems to say something different. However, we don’t need industry info to find competitors, even close competitors.
(1) The good news: finding competitors is not hard.
Both Hoovers.com and YahooFinance provide the three top or direct competitors at no charge. For FactSet Research (FDS), they both list Bloomberg, Dow Jones, and Thomson Reuters which are shown as private companies although Thomson Reuters (TRI) is a public company.
Morningstar analyst reports also show close competitors and, for FDS, list Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters. These reports are usually a pay service, but I get them on-line and free from my local library (so you might want to check yours).
(2) The bad news: identifying a company’s industry for comparison purposes is much more difficult and way too confusing. We often want to compare a company’s performance with industry averages, such as PTPM and ROE, and to do that intelligently we need to identify the appropriate industry. Here’s what I found for FactSet Research (FDS):
** Hoovers places FDS in the Information Collection & Delivery Industry while YahooFinance puts it in the Information & Delivery Industry;
** The S&P data files from BI put FDS in the Application Software Industry;
** But, the S&P data from BI used by its Online SSG put FDS in the Internet Publishing and Broadcasting and Web Search Portal Industry;
** Reuters.com puts FDS in the Investment Services Industry;
** Zacks.com puts FDS in the Business Information Services Industry;
** Value Line puts FDS in the Information Services Industry;
** CNN Money puts FDS in the Publishing Industry;
** The Morningstar/Hemscott data files from StockCentral put FDS in the Information & Delivery Services Industry while Morningstar.com puts FDS in the Business Support Industry.
I count a whopping six different industries for FDS: Information something-or-other, Application Software, Investment Services, Business Info/Support, Publishing, and Internet Publishing/Broadcasting/Web Portal. Even worse, the S&P data files from BI and the S&P data used by BI’s Online SSG place FDS in different industries: Application Software and Internet Publishing etc. That’s nuts!!
(3) Now the really bad news: different industry classifications for the same company mean different industry averages and that means conflicting comparisons. Here’s a table comparing FDS to its industry with data from 5 websites. In terms of Pre-Tax Profit Margin, FDS is better than its industry average at all 5 sites, but ranges from Slightly Better, Better, to Much Better. However, in terms of Return on Equity, FDS ranges wildly from Much Worse, Slightly Worse, Better. to Much Better. See for yourself:
| FACTSET RESEARCH SYSTEMS (FDS) | Better Investing | Online SSG at Better Investing | Stock Central | MSN Money | Reuters |
| FDS Industry | Application Software | Internet Publishing etc | Information & Delivery Services | Information & Delivery Services | Invest-ment Services |
| Source of FDS Industry and Company Data | S&P | S&P | Morningstar-Hemscott | Thomson Reuters | Thomson Reuters |
| Date | 5-6-09 | 5-6-09 | 5-6-09 | 5-6-09 | 5-6-09 |
| PRE-TAX PROFIT MARGIN (PTPM) – 5 year average | |||||
| FDS PTPM average | 34.10% | 34.06% | 34.10% | 33.80% | 33.82% |
| Industry PTPM average | 13.80% | 19.10% | 23.20% | 27.80% | 14.37% |
| FDS is BETTER or WORSE | MUCH BETTER | BETTER | BETTER | SLIGHTLY BETTER | MUCH BETTER |
| RETURN ON EQUIRT (ROE) – 5 year average | |||||
| FDS ROE average | 25.90% | 25.85% | 26.30% | 29.10% | 20.44% |
| Industry ROE average | 22.80% | 27.89% | 83.80% | 19.10% | 00.64% |
| FDS is BETTER or WORSE | SLIGHTLY BETTER | SLIGHTLY WORSE!! | MUCH WORSE!!! | BETTER | MUCH BETTER |
(4) Here’s how I cope with this mess:
(A) When I use the S&P data files from Better Investing, which I do most of the time, I compare my SSGs to S&P industry data that is compiled by Better Investing’s Mid-Michigan Chapter. (BI itself does not offer such industry data although I have asked several times.) This data uses the same industry classifications as the BI S&P data files and the Toolkit software.
** On BI’s home page, available to members only, click the Chapters tab, then Chapter Listing, then Mid-Michigan Chapter.
** Scroll down to “Industry Averages” which is supposed to be updated monthly and is broken down into 7 columns of info for each industry, including: 10 year Revenue and EPS growth, 5 year average Pretax Profit Margin and Return on Equity, and 5 year average Debt to Equity.
** For example, S&P places FDS in the Application Software Industry which had an average 5-year PTPM of 13.80% and ROE of 27.89% as of March 2009. By comparison, my SSG shows that FDS has a much better average PTPM (34.06%), but slightly worse ROE (25.90%).
(B) StockCentral.com also provides industry data (and SSG data) from Morningstar/Hemscott and a membership is also required. The scope and layout of this industry data is much better than the S&P data, its very well thought out and thorough.
** Hemscott places FDS in the Information & Delivery Services Industry which is different from S&P’s industry. It shows 19 companies by name and, using Hemscott industry as well as company data, FDS ranks:
->-> 2nd in terms of 5-year average PTPM (23.2% industry vs 34.1% FDS),
->-> 3rd in 5-year average EPS growth (6.4% industry vs 21.6% FDS),
->-> 5th in 5-year average ROE (83.8% industry vs 26.3% FDS).
** Note the very large difference in the ROE data between S&P’s Application Software industry (22.80%) and Hemscott’s Information & Delivery Services Industry (83.8%). This is really getting muddled as FDS’s ROE is slightly better when compared to S&P’s industry, but much worse when compared to Morningstar/Hemscott’s industry.
** Because Stock Central sets forth its Hemscott data company-by-company, I can tell that its ROE industry average (83.8%) is skewed by one company (Dunn & Bradstreet at an incredible 349.9%) which makes FDS look much worse by comparison.
(C) If I was making a presentation or just wanted to be thorough, I would use the comparisons from both S&P and Hemscott. And, I’d make sure to identify the industry name, data source and date I checked the data. If I didn’t pay for any membership/subscriptions, then I’d use comparisons from both YahooFinance and Reuters or MSN.
These industry comparisons are so potentially misleading, especially the different industry classifications at different websites, that two data sources seem way better than one.
- armin
p.s. Let me know if this post was useful as I’ve stopped using polls.
